Distributional Impacts of Cost-effective Spatially Homogeneous and Regionalized Agri-Environment Payments. A case study of a Grassland Scheme in Saxony, Germany by Markova-Nenova, Nonka et al.
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Distributional Impacts of Cost-effective
Spatially Homogeneous and Regionalized
Agri-Environment Payments. A case
study of a Grassland Scheme in Saxony,
Germany
Markova-Nenova, Nonka and Wätzold, Frank and Sturm,
Astrid
Brandenburg University of Technology Cottbus-Senftenberg,
Brandenburg University of Technology Cottbus-Senftenberg,
Brandenburg University of Technology Cottbus-Senftenberg
16 December 2020
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/104759/
MPRA Paper No. 104759, posted 22 Dec 2020 14:41 UTC
1 
 
Distributional Impacts of Cost-effective Spatially Homogeneous and 
Regionalized Agri-Environment Payments. A case study of a Grassland 
Scheme in Saxony, Germany 
 
Nonka Markova-Nenovaa, e-mail: markova@b-tu.de, 
Frank Wätzolda, e-mail: waetzold@b-tu.de, Astrid Sturma, e-mail: sturm@b-tu.de 
aBrandenburg University of Technology Cottbus-Senftenberg, Chair of Environmental 
Economics, P.O. Box 101344, 03013 Cottbus, Germany 
 
Abstract: 
Economic analysis of agri-environment schemes (AES) has focused mainly on improving their 
cost-effectiveness. In contrast, the distributional impacts of AES have received less attention in 
the economic literature, even though the implementation of cost-effective policies can receive 
much more support, if their distributional impacts are desirable. We combine cost-effectiveness 
and distributional considerations and investigate empirically for a case study (a grassland 
program in Saxony, Germany), if trade-offs or synergies exist between improving the cost-
effectiveness of an AES and its distributional impacts. We apply an ecological-economic 
modelling procedure to design two cost-effective AES - one scheme with spatially 
homogeneous payments and one with regionally differentiated payments. To compare the 
distributional impacts of the schemes we use the criteria of equality, equity and Rawls’ maximin 
criterion. Our results suggest that substantial cost-effectiveness improvements can be achieved 
with the spatially differentiated AES. Regarding distributional impacts, on the federal state level 
and within the largest region, we find a trade-off between equality and cost-effectiveness, 
whereas equity generally increases with improved cost-effectiveness of the AES, except in the 
largest region. On Rawls’ maximin criterion the spatially homogeneous payments are preferred, 
as they lead to the highest net benefits in the poorest region. This shows the importance of 
analyzing the distributional implications of cost-effective AES on different spatial levels. 
Keywords: cost-effectiveness, distribution, fairness, maximin, agri-environmental payments, 
ecological-economic modelling, spatial differentiation  
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1 Introduction 
Agri-environment schemes (AES) aim to support land use measures of farmers that are costly 
to them but beneficial to biodiversity, the environment or the landscape. AES can be found in 
most developed countries. Examples of AES include the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) 
in the US (Claassen et al., 2008), the Agri-environmental Grassland Premium in France (Buller 
and Brives, 2017), the Agri-environmental, Climate Change and Animal Protection Program in 
Baden-Württemberg, Germany (Ministry of Rural Affairs, Food and Consumer Protection 
Baden-Wuerttemberg, 2016), and the Australian National Landcare Program (Robins, 2018). 
AES exist also in some developing countries (e.g. the Sloping Land Conversion Program 
(SLCP) in China (Lu and Yin, 2020) where they are usually referred to as Payments for 
Ecosystem Services (PES). 
A large part of the economic analysis of AES has focused on how to improve their cost-
effectiveness (Ansell et al., 2016), here understood as how to design AES so that for available 
financial resources environmental aims are achieved to the greatest possible extent (Wätzold 
and Schwertner, 2005). Regarding the design of cost-effective AES, the spatial optimization of 
schemes has become a key concern (Engel, 2015), especially with respect to schemes targeted 
at the conservation of biodiversity (Hanley et al., 2012). Four main threads of discussion can 
be distinguished: The first thread analyzes possible improvement in cost-effectiveness through 
‘benefit-cost targeting’ which is normally superior to only (environmental) benefit or cost 
targeting strategies (Babcock et al. 1996), but can be less cost-effective when there is a 
considerable output price effect (Wu et al., 2001).  The second thread investigates incentives to 
provide spatially aggregated (Parkhurst et al., 2002) or evenly allocated conservation areas 
(Bamière et al., 2011). A focus has been on analyzing the cost-effectiveness of payment designs 
such as the agglomeration bonus and the agglomeration payment schemes to provide spatially 
aggregated habitats (Drechsler et al., 2016; Lewis et al., 2011; Wätzold and Drechsler, 2014). 
The third line of discourse focuses on the spatial scale of habitat conservation in general. It is 
suggested that depending on the different types of species the appropriate management scale 
differs (Ekroos et al., 2016), e.g. landscape-scale conservation management is considered more 
cost-effective than farm-scale management in the case of ecosystem services provided by 
mobile species, which require a spatial habitat pattern on larger scale (Cong et al., 2014). The 
forth thread is based on the idea of spatially differentiated payments. If cost and benefit 
functions differ among regions, a payment scheme that includes regionally differentiated 
payments is likely to be more cost-effective than a scheme with homogeneous payments across 
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regions (Wätzold and Drechsler, 2005). In an empirical analysis of different hypothetical AES 
to conserve birds in the Peak District in England, Armsworth et al. (2012) identified substantial 
cost-effectiveness gains of a spatially differentiated payment scheme albeit at the expense of 
substantial transaction costs.  
In contrast to cost-effectiveness considerations, the distributional impacts of AES have received 
less attention. Wu and Yu (2017) investigate cost-effectiveness equity trade-offs using the CRP 
as a case study. They find that the CRP is quite cost-effective, but not very equitable on most 
indicators used, even though large part of the fund goes to lower-income counties. Claassen et 
al. (2001) also analyze trade-offs in the design of AES. Using hypothetical scenarios, they 
investigate spatial distribution of gains and losses from the implementation of a policy for 
reducing water quality damage due to sediments. They conclude that reaching two goals, e.g. 
environmental improvement and farm income improvement, with one policy is hardly possible. 
This finding is in line with Uthes et al. (2010) who suggest that having rural development as a 
goal undermines achieving environmental benefits and cost-effectiveness of AES. By contrast, 
Gauvin et al. (2010) demonstrate that for the SLCP targeting parcels, which maximize jointly 
the environmental and poverty alleviation benefits is only slightly less cost-effective than the 
most cost-effective strategy of selecting parcels with the highest benefit–cost ratio. Similarly, 
Mouysset (2014) finds that when ecological objectives are low or high grassland management 
subsidies in France can reach simultaneously ecological and social objectives (increasing 
minimum farmer income) and at the same time minimize welfare losses. 
This paper investigates cost-effectiveness gains from a hypothetical regional differentiation of 
an AES in Saxony, Germany, and the resulting distributional impacts. By this, we contribute to 
the above-mentioned discussions in two ways. (1) Similarly to Armsworth et al. (2012), we 
empirically investigate the cost-effectiveness gains of spatially differentiated payments over 
spatially homogeneous payments. In contrast to Armsworth et al. (2012), however, the 
additional transaction costs of our proposed differentiated scheme are negligible as we do not 
suggest introducing a different scheme but just to pay farmers in different Saxon regions 
differently for the same measures. (2) By analyzing the distributional impacts of the spatial 
differentiation of the Saxon AES, we also contribute to the debate on trade-offs and synergies 
between cost-effectiveness and distributional impacts of AES.   
Our case study is an AES focused on grassland biodiversity in the federal state of Saxony, 
Germany (in the following referred to as Saxon AES). We modify the ecological-economic 
modelling procedure from Wätzold et al. (2016) in order to design a cost-effective regionalized 
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scheme and take into account distributional impacts of AES. We investigate the cost-
effectiveness gains (measured in habitat improvements for 13 bird species, 14 butterfly species 
and 7 habitat types for given budgets) of an optimized AES with homogeneous payments for 
the whole of Saxony and an optimized AES with payments differentiated according to three 
Saxon agri-economic regions in comparison to the Saxon AES. Finally, we analyse the 
distributional impacts of the Saxon AES with the distributional impacts of the two cost-effective 
alternatives, based on the principles of equality and equity/accountability (Ohl et al., 2008) and 
Rawls’ (1999) maximin criterion. 
2 Case study 
2.1 Agriculture in Saxony 
About half of the total area of the German federal state of Saxony (49.2%=9,066 km²) is used 
for agriculture with approximately 20% (1,850 km²) of the overall agricultural area being 
grassland (Saxon State Ministry of the Environment and Agriculture, 2014b). Saxony is divided 
into three agri-economic regions (Figure 1), each of which covers areas with similar physio-
geographic characteristics.  
 
Figure 1 Agri-economic regions in Saxony. 1 = WG I Sächsisches Heide- und Teichlandschaft 
(Saxon Heath and Pond Landscape), 2 = WG II Sächsisches Lößgebiet (Saxon Loess Region), 
3 = WG III Sächsisches Mittelgebirge und Vorland (Saxon Uplands and Foothills). Source: 
modified representation based on data and with the permission of the Saxon State Office for the 
Environment, Agriculture and Geology (2014).  
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These agri-economic regions include the Saxon Heath and Pond Landscape (Sächsisches 
Heide- und Teichlandschaft), the Saxon Loess Region (Sächsisches Lößgebiet) and the Saxon 
Uplands and Foothills (Sächsisches Mittelgebirge und Vorland), referred to as region 1, region 
2 and region 3 in the following. Starting from 100 m above sea level in the north lowland, the 
altitude continually rises to the south and east to approximately 900 m. Altitude is the main 
factor that leads to differences in climatic conditions and vegetation types in the different 
regions (Saxon State Institute for Agriculture, 1999). The soil productivity (expressed as 
grassland number1) is on average best in region 2 (Table 1). Regions 1 and 2 include much less 
grassland area than region 3 (Corine Land Cover, CLC, 2000, see Mewes et al., 2012).  
For our analysis we consider farms with a relatively high percentage of grassland area which 
are likely to participate in a grassland AES (e.g. cattle and dairy farms, see AppendixAppendix 
B for relevant farms according to the Farm Accountancy Data Network).  
Table 1 Comparison of the analyzed grassland farms in the three agri-economic regions of 
Saxony.  
Region Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 
Number of farmsa 33 131 197 
Average grassland numberb 38 48 35 
Range grassland numberb 17-56 32-71 13-62 
Grassland area used for modelling in hac 47,844 69,206 121,088 
Mean operating income in €/ haa 812 1,149 910 
Mean operating income in €/ ha 
as percent of region 1a 
100.00% 141.50% 112.07% 
(gross operating surplus+ personnel costs in 
€)/ full time workera 31,300 38,293 32,231 
(gross operating surplus + personnel costs in €)/ 
full time worker as percent of region 1a 
100.00% 122.34% 102.97% 
Sources: a Source: Saxon State Ministry of the Environment and Agriculture (2014a), own calculation based on 
surveyed farms.  
b Source: Representation based on data and with the permission of the Saxon State Office for the Environment, 
Agriculture and Geology (2014), own calculation. 
c Source: based on Corine Land Cover, CLC, 2000 (see Mewes et al. 2012). 
 
                                                 
1 The grassland number (GZ) (ranging from 1 to 100) is a measure of the productivity of grassland in Germany 
and indicates the percentage yield ratio of a certain grassland area to the best soil. It depends on many different 
factors, such as soil type, climate, moisture, and relief (Soil Estimation Act, 2007, Germany). 
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In data provided by the Saxon State Ministry of the Environment and Agriculture (2014a), we 
find altogether 33 relevant farms in region 1, 131 farms in region 2 and 197 farms in region 3 
(Table 1). The actual number of farms is higher, since not all farms participated in the 
agricultural data collection survey. However, the data provided in Table 1 can be considered 
representative in terms of differences between regions 1-3. 
To identify the poorest region, we would ideally use individual farm income data. However, 
due to a lack of data on the farm level, we compare only the mean incomes of the three regions 
and define the region with the lowest mean income as the poorest region. A key indicator for 
the regional comparison of income is “gross operating surplus plus personnel costs per full time 
worker”. This indicator is used in official statistics to indicate the sustainable disposable income 
per full time worker and is not directly dependent on the number, size, and legal forms of farms 
in the regions (Saxon State Ministry of the Environment and Agriculture, 2014a). On this factor, 
the income in region 2 is 22% higher than the income in region 1 and the income in region 3 is 
only slightly higher than in region 1 (3%). The mean operating income per hectare in region 2 
is even 42% higher than that in region 1, which corresponds to the high soil productivity in 
region 2. The mean operating income per hectare in region 3 is 12% higher compared to region 
1. In sum, both indicators suggest that income is substantially higher in region 2 than in the 
other two regions and it is only slightly higher in region 3 than in region 1. 
2.2 Conservation challenge and Saxon grassland scheme  
As in many other parts of Europe, since the 1970s agricultural intensification and amelioration 
has led to a loss of grassland types resulting in uniform grasslands in Saxony (Bastian et al., 
2002, Klimek et al., 2007). This has resulted in a general loss of biodiversity and the 
endangerment of many grassland species such as meadow birds and butterflies (Bastian et al., 
2002, Wätzold et al., 2016). To reverse this trend and support extensive grassland management, 
the federal state of Saxony has implemented AES for grassland. 
Between 2007 and 2014 the AES pertaining to grassland in Saxony was the programme 
“Extensive grassland use, nature conforming grassland management and conservation” 
(“Extensive Grünlandwirtschaft, Naturschutzgerechte Grünlandbewirtschaftung und Pflege” - 
Saxon State Ministry of the Environment and Agriculture, 2015). The scheme comprised eight 
different mowing and grazing measures and four other measures (e.g. transformation of arable 
land into grassland and the impoverishment of grassland soils). We focus on the mowing and 
grazing measures (Table A. 1 provides details of these measures) because they can be analyzed 
by the ecological-economic modelling procedure applied in our analysis. The payments per 
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hectare, the size of participating area and the total budget spent on the measures in 2013 are 
used as inputs for the simulation of the Saxon grassland AES with the ecological-economic 
modelling procedure. 
3 Ecological-economic modelling procedure  
For our analysis, we apply the ecological-economic modelling procedure from Wätzold et al. 
(2016) to analyze the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of grassland AES and modify it in 
order to analyze cost-effectiveness gains from regionalization and its distributional impacts. 
The following section provides a brief overview of the modelling procedure. For a detailed 
description, we refer to Wätzold et al. (2016). The ecological-economic modelling procedure 
consists of several components, which are depicted in Figure 2. Different species and grassland 
measures with their characteristics as well as landscape parameters are used as inputs for the 
calculation of the costs of different grassland measures (in the agri-economic cost assessment) 
and their ecological effects on the selected species (in the ecological model). These results can 
be used for simulation or optimization of an AES. We further modified the modelling procedure 
to employ the results of the simulation and optimization for the analysis of the regionalization 
and the distributional aspects. The next sections provide an overview of the modelling 
procedure, which is implemented in the decision support software DSS-Ecopay (see Sturm et 
al., 2018 for details on the software). 
3.1 Conservation aims, land-use measures and landscape information 
For Saxony, the procedure considers altogether 13 bird species, 14 butterfly species and 7 
habitat types (Table A. 2) all of which are threatened or endangered. Information about certain 
characteristics of the species and habitat types related to the impact of grassland measures is 
available which is used as input in the ecological model. Altogether 475 different mowing 
regimes, grazing regimes and combinations of mowing and grazing regimes are included as 
land-use measures in the procedure. Mowing regimes differ in terms of the frequency and 
timing of mowing, restrictions regarding N-fertilizer input and the existence of mowing strips. 
Grazing regimes differ in terms of the beginning and length of the grazing period, the livestock 
density and the type of livestock. Regime combinations of mowing and grazing vary in terms 
of timing of mowing, start of grazing, stocking rate and type of livestock (see Wätzold et al., 
2016 for details). 
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Landscape information (e.g. altitude, land use, land productivity, soil moisture) is available on 
the level of grid cells (pixels) with a resolution of 250m x 250m=6.25 ha and is used as input 
in the ecological model and the agri-economic cost assessment. 
 
Figure 2 Components of the ecological-economic modelling procedure. Source: modified from 
Wätzold et al. (2016). 
3.2 Ecological model 
The ecological model evaluates the impacts of the different measures on the different species 
and habitat types in a spatially differentiated manner, i.e. differentiated for each grid cell (Johst 
et al., 2015 provides a detailed description of the ecological model). The effect of land use 
measures on species and habitat types is measured in terms of the habitat quality on each grid 
cell. This local habitat quality shows the suitability of the habitat for the reproduction of the 
species and can take values between 0 (reproduction is not feasible on a grid cell) and 1 
(maximum habitat quality for the reproduction of a species on a grid cell). The ecological model 
9 
 
estimates for each grid cell l the local habitat quality qj
l,m resulting from a measure m at timing 
tm and the overall achieved effective habitat area Aj
eff
 for a species j (see Eq. 1).  
The Aj
eff
 is calculated by summing up the area of all grid cells in the landscape multiplied with 
their local habitat quality qj
l,m, under the condition that the measure m results in a habitat quality 
higher than a predefined minimum habitat quality qj
min for a species, which is set to 0.1 for 
butterflies and 0.3 for birds and habitat types based on expert knowledge (cf. Wätzold et al., 
2016). 
)(
))(;(
,
min,
m
qtqrl
ml
j
leff
j tqAA
jm
ml
jj


                   Eq. 1 
where Al  = 6.25 ha represents a grid cell. 
The occurrence and dispersal rate of a species are accounted for in the calculation of habitat 
quality by summing up only grid cells that contain a species or are within a certain radius of 
dispersal (rj). For birds this radius is assumed to be infinite, due to their good dispersal ability, 
whereas for butterflies rj is specified for each species based on expert knowledge.  In the 
ecological-economic modeling procedure, the effective habitat area Aj
eff
 is the indicator for the 
ecological effect of a land use measure m on a species j on the regional scale and is used to 
assess the ecological effectiveness of a measure. The higher the effective habitat area Aj
eff
, the 
more effective is the measure. 
3.3 Agri-economic cost assessment  
The agri-economic cost assessment estimates the costs of the different measures spatially 
differentiated for each grid cell. Due to data access restrictions, the ecological-economic 
modelling procedure does not rely on individual farm data, but considers grid cells instead. That 
is, in the modelling procedure, one grid cell stands for one virtual farmer. Farmers are assumed 
to maximize their profits. Thus, a farmer (grid cell l) participates in an AES and adopts a 
measure m, if the payment pm at least covers his costs of participating in the scheme. 
pm ≥ cl, m(tm) + tc                 Eq. 2 
where tc represents the transaction costs of the farmer to participate in a scheme, arising from 
e.g. paperwork and communication with authorities, and )(, m
ml
tc  the opportunity costs of the 
farmer for not being able to carry out the profit-maximizing grassland use. The opportunity 
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costs depend on the yield loss as well as changes in variable and labor costs, which, in turn, 
depend on the timing mt  of the land use measure m. Mewes et al. (2015) provides a thorough 
explanation of the agri-economic cost assessment. 
3.4 Simulation of an AES 
The ecological-economic modeling procedure can simulate the effects of an AES on species 
and habitat types. In the procedure, an AES is defined by a single or a combination of land use 
measures m, a corresponding payment pm (per year and ha) for each measure, and a maximum 
area of implementation Ammax for each measure. For the simulation of the Saxon AES the Ammax 
was defined as the size of the area on which a specific measure was applied in 2013 (Table A. 
1.).  
If a farmer can select between different measures, the farmer (grid cell) is assumed to adopt the 
measure with the highest difference between payment and participation costs, i.e. the measure 
with the highest producer surplus PS l,m, as long as it is positive (PSl,m>0) and the maximum 
participating area Ammax for the measure has not been reached. 
max:  PSl, m= pm – (c
l, m(tm) + tc)                           Eq. 3 
For technical details of the simulation we refer to Wätzold et al. (2016). The result of the 
simulation is a particular land use pattern characterized by measures and payments assigned to 
grid cells and habitat quality for each species in each participating grid cell. The ecological 
effectiveness of an AES is assessed by calculating Aj
eff
 for each species and grassland type. The 
total budget B for an AES is the sum of the products of the payments pm for each measure with 
the size Al = 6.25 ha and number Nm of grid cells where this measure is applied: 
B = 
m
lmm ANp   Eq. 4 
3.5 Cost-effectiveness analysis 
The cost-effectiveness analysis in the modelling procedure can be done in two ways; 
minimization of a budget for given conservation goals and maximization of goal attainment 
under a budget constraint, B0. Here, we focus on the latter option, i.e. to maximize the total 
effective habitat area Atot
eff
 for a number of predefined species with a given budget. 
Atot
eff= ∑ wjAjeff
j
→max subject to 0BB   Eq. 5 
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The formula above can reflect a decision-maker’s preferences for the protection of certain 
species through the insertion of weights wj. Here, we give equal weights to all 34 species and 
habitat types identified for Saxony as they are all protected. 
Since the core topic of the paper is the cost-effectiveness gain of regional differentiation of an 
AES and related distributional impacts, in the optimization we consider only the land use 
measures from the Saxon AES (by contrast Wätzold et al. (2016) use a pool of 58 best-candidate 
measures). The optimization is carried out with simulated annealing and maximizes the 
ecological effectiveness of the Saxon AES under the given overall budget constraint from the 
simulation. The result of the optimization is a cost-effective AES, i.e. a set of land use measures 
with the corresponding payments per ha, the area covered by each measure, the budget required, 
as well as the effect on the different species and habitat types Aj
eff
. 
To compare the cost-effectiveness of the different schemes, we use Efftype, which is the effective 
habitat area Atype
eff
 for each species type (i.e. for birds, butterflies, habitat types or all species) 
per Euro budget Btype spent: 
Efftype=
Atype
eff
Btype
                   Eq. 6 
This indicator taken for all species together Effall, i.e. based on the total effective habitat area 
Atot
eff
, should be discussed with caution, since due to their much higher dispersal radius the 
conserved areas for bird species (Abirds
eff
) tend to be much higher than for butterflies (Abutterflies
eff
). 
We therefore make some general comparisons based on all species, but also point to the 
differences in cost-effectiveness for the different species types. 
3.6 Regionalization  
To investigate the cost-effectiveness of regionalization, the modelling procedure is modified in 
the following way. GIS data on the spatial distribution of agri-economic regions (from Saxon 
State Office for the Environment, Agriculture and Geology, 2014) has been added as an input 
to the model. Thus, the existing pixels are attributed to the three regions (pixels which cross the 
border between two regions are excluded). For each region, we calculate the budget spent in 
the simulation of the Saxon AES. The resulting regional budgets are then used in separate 
optimizations of the payments for the three regions to ensure comparability with the simulation 
results. For each region, the ecologic-economic modelling procedure maximizes the ecological 
benefit under the given budget constraint.  
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3.7 Distributional impacts analysis 
We use the results of the modelling procedure to compare the distributional impacts of the 
Saxon AES, the optimized and the regionally optimized AES. The comparison is based on three 
fairness principles: equality, equity and maximin. 
According to the equality principle (based on Konow, 2003; Leventhal, 1980) individual 
opportunities, rights, proportions etc. should be equal. In the case of AES, we concentrate on 
the egalitarian view of equality of outcomes (Pascual et al., 2010), i.e. compensations in AES 
should be equal for all farmers. This corresponds to the distribution of equal payments (P).  
The equity principle or accountability principle (Homans, 1974; Konow, 2003) stipulates that 
a fair output distribution should be in proportion to an individual’s input or effort. In AES equity 
translates to compensations that are in accordance to the individual conservation efforts of the 
farmers, i.e. to their opportunity costs (Ohl et al., 2008). This relates to the distribution of 
producer surplus (PS), which is the difference between the received payments and the incurred 
opportunity costs. Therefore, we associate higher equity with a more equal distribution of PS.  
The maximin principle introduced by Rawls (1999, p. 266) states that: “Social and economic 
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are … to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged”. 
In the context of PES, this principle has been interpreted by Pascual et al. (2010) as maximizing 
“the net benefit to the poorest landholders”. As we are unable to identify single farm income, 
we assume that a farmer in region 1 - the region with the lowest income expressed as “gross 
operating surplus plus personnel costs per full time worker” – is “poorest”. The net benefit in 
our case corresponds to the PS of the farmers. When comparing the schemes based on the 
maximin principle we investigate in which scheme the PSmin,  PSmean and PSsum in the “poorest 
region” - region 1 - are highest. Due to data limitations and asymmetric information between 
the farmers and the regulator about the farmers’ costs, in practice a pro-poor scheme may not 
concentrate explicitly on the PS of the poorest farmers, but just try to allocate higher payments 
to poorer participants. Therefore, in our analysis based on the maximin principle, in addition to 
the comparison of PS, we also investigate in which scheme the payments (i.e. Pmin, Pmean and 
Psum) in the “poorest” region 1 are highest. 
In order to analyze the equality of the simulated and optimized AES for Saxony on a federal 
state and regional level, we compare the payment distributions, and for analyzing the equity of 
the schemes we compare the producer surplus distributions among pixels as a proxy for farmers. 
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Both comparisons are based on the Atkinson index (Atkinson 1970), with Whitehouse (1995) 
defining the Atkinson index (AI) as a measure of income inequality as follows:  
𝐴𝐼(𝜀) = 1 −  (1𝑛 ∑ (𝑦𝑖?̅? )𝑛𝑖=1 (1−𝜀)) 11−𝜀, for 𝜀 ≠  1 Eq. 7 
   𝐴𝐼(1) = 1 −  ∏ (𝑦𝑖?̅? )𝑛𝑖=1 1/𝑛, for 𝜀 =  1 Eq. 8 
where 𝑦𝑖 refers to the individual income and ?̅? refers to the average income of individuals in a 
population of size 𝑛.  
In our case, 𝑦𝑖 stands for payment (P) respectively producer surplus (PS), and ?̅? corresponds to 
the average payment or producer surplus. The Atkinson index takes values from 0 to 1, the 
lower the value, the more equal (or in our case equitable) the distribution, whereby perfect 
equality/equity corresponds to a value of 0 for the Atkinson index. 
The calculation of the Atkinson index is based on a parameter epsilon (ε), which can reflect 
different levels of inequality/inequity aversion and thus different social welfare preferences. 
The higher the value of ε, the stronger the inequality/inequity aversion, with ε = 0 corresponding 
to no interest in the distribution and high values of ε corresponding to high inequality/inequity 
aversion and Rawlsian preferences. In accordance with Schlör et al. (2013) the ε parameter can 
reflect preferences for equality (in our case also equity) and efficiency and can be defined as a 
ratio between an equality/equity parameter α and an efficiency parameter β, where these 
parameters can each take values between 1 and 5: 𝜀 =  𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦/𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦  =  𝛼(1,2,3,4,5)𝛽(1,2,3,4,5)               Eq. 9 
Thus, ε ranges from 0.2 with low inequality/inequity aversion and strong efficiency preferences 
to 5 with high inequality/inequity aversion and Rawlsian preferences. With higher values of ε 
the Atkinson index becomes more sensitive to income inequalities, in our case – to payment or 
producer surplus inequalities. The special case of ε = 1 refers to social preferences attributing 
equal weights to equality (in our case also equity) and efficiency and we employ this assumption 
in our calculations. 
We transform the values of the Atkinson (AI) index by defining EP as a measure of equality 
and EPS as a measure of equity with higher values indicating more equal/equitable 
distributions, where: 
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𝐸𝑃 = 1 − 𝐴𝐼𝑃(𝜀 = 1)  = 1 −  ∏ (𝑃𝑖?̅? )𝑛𝑖=1 1/𝑛  Eq. 10 
𝐸𝑃𝑆 = 1 − 𝐴𝐼𝑃𝑆(𝜀 = 1) = 1 −  ∏ (𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑃𝑆̅̅̅̅ )𝑛𝑖=1 1/𝑛
  
 
Eq. 11 
Here i refers to pixels instead of individuals or farmers, due to the mentioned limitations of data 
accessibility. Using these measures of equality/ equity we compare the Saxon AES and the 
optimized schemes based on the equality and equity principles. 
4 Cost-effectiveness results and analysis 
4.1 Overview of results 
Simulation 
We find that the Saxon AES contributes considerably to the conservation of endangered 
grassland birds, but fails to protect most of the butterfly species and habitat types (Figure 3 and 
Table A. 2). All bird species, except the crested lark, are conserved to some extent, whereas 
this applies only to five out of 14 butterfly species and four out of seven habitat types. All 10 
measures from the Saxon AES are to some extent applied in regions 2 and 3, whereas in region 
1 only nine measures are applied (an overview of the regionally differentiated results from the 
simulation and optimizations is found in Table A. 3) 
Statewide optimization 
Only seven out of the 10 measures in the Saxon AES are included in the statewide optimized 
scheme – five in region 1, three in region 2 and seven in region 3. Compared to the Saxon AES, 
the cost-effective AES leads to about 33% more Abirds
eff
 and Ahabitats
eff  (Table 2) whereas Abutterflieseff  is 
a bit (16%) lower. The conservation levels of the optimized AES are higher for eight bird 
species, two habitat types, and one butterfly species. Overall, the optimized scheme generates 
effective habitat area for 11 birds, two butterflies and four habitat types. 
Regional optimization 
The regionalized cost-effective AES conserves overall 12 out of 13 bird species, six out of 14 
butterfly species and three out of seven habitat types and includes all 10 measures from the 
Saxon AES (four measures in region 1, six measures in region 2 and all 10 measures in region 
3). Despite a 13% lower budget, it leads for the whole of Saxony to a 61.23% larger Abirdseff , 
596.46% more Abutterflies
eff
, and a 45.86% larger Ahabitats
eff   than the Saxon AES (Table 2). The 
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conservation levels are higher for most species and habitat types, except for the Garganey, the 
Snipe, alluvial meadows and lowland hay meadows. In comparison to the statewide cost-
effective payment scheme, the effective habitat areas are 21% ( Abirdseff ), 729% (Abutterflieseff ), and 
10% higher (Ahabitatseff )  and the regionalized payments perform better for most species and 
habitat types, except the Corncrake, the Five-spot Burnet, alluvial meadows and lowland hay 
meadows (Table A. 2 and Figure 3). 
 
Table 2 Regional comparison of the (cost-)effectiveness of the Saxon AES, the statewide and 
the regional optimizations. 
 Run Regions Abirds
eff
 
in ha 
Abutterflies
eff
 
in ha 
Ahabitats
eff   
in ha 
Atot
eff
  
in ha 
Budget 
(Psum) 
in Euro 
Producer 
surplus 
(PSsum) in 
Euro 
Saxon AES 
  
  
  
region 1  28 755  0.65  1 225  29 981 2 104 425 1 258 621 
region 2  47 273  15.26   816  48 105 2 905 838 1 498 020 
region 3  78 702  29.66  1 763  80 495 6 129 313 4 467 608 
Saxony  154 731  45.58  3 805  158 581 11 139 575 7 224 249 
as percent difference to simulation: 
statewide 
optimization 
  
  
region 1 96.63% -100.00% 5.86% 92.92% 11.40% 74.97% 
region 2 66.92% -13.31% -100.00% 64.06% -3.30% 105.73% 
region 3 -9.93% -14.42% 113.77% -7.22% -5.03% -34.95% 
Saxony 33.36% -16.05% 33.14% 33.34% -1.48% 13.37% 
regional 
optimization 
  
  
region 1 110.90% -0.28% -100.00% 102.28% -60.65% -53.56% 
region 2 65.06% -100.00% -72.74% 62.66% -0.48% 96.33% 
region 3 40.78% 977.90% 202.12% 44.66% -2.35% -80.09% 
Saxony 61.23% 596.46% 45.86% 61.02% -12.88% -38.89% 
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Figure 3 Comparison of the cost-effectiveness of the simulation (simul) with the statewide 
optimization (opti10) and regional optimization (regopti10) for birds (a), habitat types (b) and 
butterflies (c). The y-axis indicates the effective habitat area Ajeff achieved for each species in 
ha. 
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4.2 Analysis of results 
In the analysis of the results, we focus on an explanation of why a regionalized payment scheme 
leads to cost-effectiveness improvements compared to the Saxon AES and the optimized Saxon 
AES with homogeneous payments. Generally, the optimization is able to identify cost-effective 
measures and induce their (increased) uptake for both optimized schemes. In both optimizations 
the participating area of the general mowing measures is reduced compared to the Saxon AES, 
due to their much lower benefit-cost ratios, whereas the participating area for ‘mowing strips’ 
and ‘rotational grazing’, the best-performing and lowest-cost measures, is increased. This 
mechanism can explain very well the increase in cost-effectiveness in the statewide 
optimization (33% more Atot
eff
 with nearly the same budget). 
The regional optimization increases the overall cost-effectiveness further by taking advantage 
of cost differences between the three regions (Wätzold and Drechsler 2005). Payments are set 
lower in regions 1 and 3 with low opportunity costs than in region 2 with high opportunity costs 
(Table A. 3). By contrast, in the statewide optimization the payments are defined over the whole 
of Saxony and cannot take into account cost differences among regions. The rise in cost-
effectiveness through regionalization comes only from the two regions with low opportunity 
costs (region 1 and 3); for region 2 with high opportunity costs, the regional optimization does 
not improve overall cost-effectiveness (Effall in Table 3) further than the statewide optimized 
scheme. In this region both optimizations reduce substantially the number of measures and are 
therefore less effective and cost-effective for butterflies and habitat types than the Saxon AES. 
Thus, there are regional differences and the optimizations do not improve the cost-effectiveness 
for all different species types in all regions. However, on the federal state level the regional 
optimization is most cost-effective for all species types (highest Efftype values over Saxony for 
all species types in Table A. 4 in the appendix). 
Additional cost-effectiveness improvements can arise in regionalization from the possibility to 
spatially focus payments relevant for the conservation of specific species, which occur only or 
mainly in one or several specific regions. In our study, this is particularly relevant for butterflies. 
The regional optimization generates substantially higher Abutterflies
eff
, but only in region 3, which 
has the largest grassland area, low opportunity costs and in general most butterfly occurrence. 
In the regional optimization, all ten measures from the Saxon AES are applied in this region 
(Table A. 3) generating the diversity of grassland use needed to conserve different butterfly 
species (Johst et al. 2015, Wätzold et al. 2016). By contrast, in the statewide optimization due 
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to the lower number of measures with mostly higher payments in all regions the cost-
effectiveness for butterflies is even lower than in the Saxon AES. 
In the other low-cost region 1 the overall cost-effectiveness is increased to a very high extent 
in the regional optimization by setting much lower payments and focusing only on four high 
benefit-cost measures. Thus, by aligning the payments and measures to the regional specifics, 
and offering much lower payments, the regional optimization is able to significantly improve 
the overall performance of the scheme in the two low-cost regions. 
Interestingly, the resulting budgets in the regional optimizations are close to the budget 
constraints derived from the simulations in regions 2 and 3, but about 60% below the constraint 
in region 1. This large reduction in the budget results from lower payments, which lead to a 
situation where the available grassland area for mowing measures is utilized completely without 
reaching the budget constraint. The lower payments are feasible due to the lower land 
productivity in region 1 and the resulting lower cost of AES participation. 
5 Distributional impacts and their relation with cost-effectiveness  
In the analysis of distributional impacts, we use the measures introduced in section 3.7, the 
calculated values for which are presented in (Table 3). When we refer to the cost-effectiveness 
of the schemes in this section we consider the overall cost-effectiveness (Effall in Table 3). 
5.1 Comparison based on equality and equity principles 
The Saxon AES has similar payment levels for all ten measures, the statewide optimization 
results in less measures with quite different payment levels, and the regional optimization leads 
to even more unequal payment distribution, due to the different levels of opportunity costs used 
as basis for the payments in the different regions. Thus, as expected, on the federal state level 
P are most equally distributed in the Saxon AES and least equally distributed in the regional 
optimization. 
The statewide optimization is, in general, most equitable. There the PS is most homogeneously 
distributed, as the scheme includes less measures and aligns the homogeneous payments to the 
high opportunity costs in region 2 so that for each measure P are the same and the PS levels are 
similar for most of the measures (and pixels) involved. The regionally differentiated 
optimization leads to a less homogeneous distribution of PS than the statewide optimization 
and the Saxon AES because it reduces substantially the P and thus PS for measures in regions 
1 and 3 with low opportunity costs, but the P and PS in region 2 with high opportunity costs 
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remain higher. As in the regional optimization the farmers in region 2 do not compete with 
farmers with lower opportunity costs from the other regions, some of the less cost-effective 
mowing measures with high P and PS are included in the regionalized scheme in region 2, 
whereas these measures are not applied in this region in the statewide optimization. 
Thus, on the federal state level optimized statewide payments lead to a trade-off between cost-
effectiveness and equality (EP), but a synergy of cost-effectiveness and equity (EPS), whereas 
the further overall rise in cost-effectiveness through regionalization leads to less equality and 
less equity. 
Table 3 Comparison over Saxony and for each region of the cost-effectiveness measures (Effall 
in Eq. 6), the equality measures (EP in Eq. 10) and equity measures (EPS in Eq. 11) 
Comparison 
based on: 
spatial level variable simul opti10 regopti10 
Cost-
effectiveness  
Saxony Effall 0.014 0.019 0.026 
region 1 Effall1 0.014 0.025 0.073 
region 2 Effall2 0.017 0.028 0.027 
region 3 Effall3 0.0131 0.0128 0.019 
Equality 
 
Saxony EP 0.835 0.785 0.589 
region 1 EP1 0.832 0.846 0.540 
region 2 EP2 0.941 0.945 0.863 
region 3 EP3 0.862 0.756 0.600 
Equity 
 
Saxony EPS 0.527 0.800 0.522 
region 1 EPS1 0.580 0.962 0.831 
region 2 EPS2 0.573 0.994 0.979 
region 3 EPS3 0.629 0.535 0.537 
Note: bold type indicates the most cost-effective scheme in each region and for Saxony; blue indicates that the 
optimizations are more equal/equitable than the simulation. 
Considering the situation within regions, the payments are more equally distributed in the Saxon 
AES than in the optimizations in region 3 with the largest grassland area. In the other two 
regions, the statewide optimization leads to a slightly more equal P distribution than the Saxon 
AES, because there are only low number of measures are applied. Thus, in regions 1 and 2 
higher cost-effectiveness through spatially homogeneous payments does not compromise 
equality (we have a synergy). The regional optimization however leads to a trade-off – a rise in 
inequality (lower EP) in all three regions, due to the lower payment levels and higher variation 
in P.  
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The PS-distributions from the optimizations within regions 1 and 2 are more homogeneous than 
in the Saxon AES, but less homogeneous within region 3. This means, in regions 1 and 2 
increasing the overall cost-effectiveness with the optimizations leads to a synergy - an increase 
in equity - as expected, because the PS levels vary less, due to the orientation on opportunity 
costs and also much lower number of measures applied in the optimizations in these regions. In 
region 3, the variation of PS is higher in the optimizations than in the Saxon AES, because in 
the Saxon AES almost 50% of the participating area is covered by one measure, whereas in the 
optimizations there is not one single dominating measure and also due to the higher variation 
in opportunity costs in this region.  
5.2 Comparison based on Rawls’ maximin principle 
To account for Rawlsian preferences, we focus on region 1, the “poorest region” with the lowest 
mean income (Table 1), and compare the payments (i.e. Pmin, Pmean and Psum) and the net benefits 
generated (i.e. PSmin, PSmean and PSsum) of the Saxon AES and the optimizations. Surprisingly 
in region 1 all three net benefit values, as well as Pmin and Psum are highest in the statewide 
optimization, only Pmean is highest in the Saxon AES (Table 4, which has relatively low benefit-
cost ratio and thus less relevance in the statewide optimization.).  
Table 4 Regional comparison of the minimum and average payments (Pmin, Pmean and Psum) and 
producer surplus (PSmin, PSmean and PSsum) from the simulation and optimizations (values in 
Euro). 
Region 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Variable PS1min PS2min PS3min PS1mean PS2mean PS3mean PS1sum PS2sum PS3sum 
Simul 8.22 8.22 8.22 119.87 62.93 194.46 1 258 621 1 498 020 4 467 608 
opti10 100 100 1.53 123.63 123.68 135.52 2 202 230 3 081 842 2 906 146 
regopti10 0.02 62.55 0.37 31.73 127.11 23.19 565 233 3 167 524 497 265 
Variable P1min P2min P3min P1mean P2mean P3mean P1sum P2sum P3sum 
Simul 79 79 79 200.42 122.06 266.78 2 104 425 2 905 838 6 129 313 
opti10 89 89 89 131.61 112.77 271.45 2 344 288 2 810 044 5 820 881 
regopti10 15 89 15 44.95 124.99 156.04 827 988 2 891 950 5 985 013 
mean 
income 
(GOS+pers. 
costs)*/ 
worker 
31,300 38,293 32,231 31,300 38,293 32,231 31,300 38,293 32,231 
Thus, considering Rawlsian preferences, in our case the statewide optimization is better than 
the Saxon AES and the regional optimization, as it leads to higher net benefits (PSmin, PSmean 
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and PSsum) in the “poorest” region 1. Due to the low opportunity costs there a larger portion of 
the budget is allocated to this region in the statewide optimization.  
Considering region 3, which is also relatively poor compared to region 2, the Saxon AES is best 
on the maximin criterion, because almost 50% of the participating area in the Saxon AES in 
this region is covered by a mowing measure with high P and PS, which has relatively low 
benefit-cost ratio and thus less relevance in the statewide optimization. 
6 Discussion and conclusion 
Here we analyze cost-effectiveness gains through regionalization of agri-environment schemes 
and the distributional impact of the regionalization applying the equality principle, the equity 
principle and Rawls’ maximin principle. We carry out our analysis by modifying an existing 
ecological-economic modelling procedure (Wätzold et al., 2016; Sturm et al., 2018) so that we 
are able to investigate regional cost-effectiveness gains and their distributional impact. We 
apply the modelling procedure to the case study of a grassland AES in Saxony. We compare a 
Saxon AES to optimized schemes with (1) spatially homogeneous payments and (2) regionally 
differentiated payments.  
Regarding the effects of regionalization on cost-effectiveness, we find that regionalization helps 
in increasing the level of bird, butterfly and habitat type conservation on the federal state level 
through aligning the measures applied and the payments to the opportunity costs of each region.  
In regions 1 and 2 (with less grassland area available), however, the regional payments do not 
enhance the protection of butterflies and habitat types. The increase in conservation for these 
species is realized mainly in region 3 with the largest grassland area and in general more species 
occurrence. Thus through regionalization a kind of specialization is possible by focusing 
payments and measures to the areas where, e.g. due to more species occurrence as in the case 
of butterflies, a higher conservation result is possible. 
By including more measures in the optimizations and not restricting the measures to the ones 
from the Saxon AES, we could have obtained higher conservation levels for butterflies and 
habitat types (Wätzold et al. 2016). However, a large number of measures is associated with 
high transaction costs. In general, improving the cost effectiveness through implementing more-
tailored regionally differentiated payments instead of simplified homogeneous payments brings 
a trade-off with equality but also with transaction costs, as suggested by Armsworth et al. (2012) 
for AES and Wätzold et al. (2010) for conservation measures in Natura 2000 sites. In this study, 
we show that high cost-effectiveness improvements in AES are possible without incurring much 
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higher transaction cost, by only choosing a limited number of measures for each region and 
setting regional payments. Whether in reality the transaction costs in implementing such a 
regionalized AES with fixed payments within regions are low, having in mind its distributional 
effects, is a matter of future research. Future research can also give more insights on the effects 
of spatial differentiation on cost-effectiveness and distributive fairness of AES in practice.  
In our theoretical analysis of distributive impacts, we apply three fairness principles: equality, 
equity and Rawls’ maximin criterion. If we choose equality as fairness principle, on the federal 
state level and in region 3 the Saxon AES is superior to the more cost-effective, optimized ones. 
If we look at fairness as equity, and choose accountability as the fairness principle, then the 
increase in cost-effectiveness in the optimized schemes leads in general to more equity, except 
in region 3 – the region with largest grassland area and relatively low opportunity costs.  
The spatially homogeneous optimized payments perform best on the maximin criterion and also 
lead to highest equality and equity in regions 1 and 2. Therefore, in our case study we do not 
find strong trade-offs in cost-effectiveness and equality/equity between the Saxon AES and the 
optimization with spatially homogeneous payments, except in region 3, with the highest number 
of farms.  
Compared to the statewide optimized scheme the regionalized payments lead to an overall rise 
in cost-effectiveness, but also to less equality and less equity. Especially prominent trade-off 
between cost-effectiveness and equality through regionalization is present in region 1, where 
with 60% less budget the regionally differentiated payments generate twice as much Atot
eff
  as the 
Saxon AES. By contrast, in the statewide optimization, where the budget constraint is set on 
the federal state level, almost the same improvement in conservation is achieved in region 1 
with much higher budget (11 % higher than in the Saxon AES in region 1). Thus, in region 1, 
the “poorest” region, spatially homogeneous payments lead to more fairness based on the 
equality, equity and the maximin criterion, but are much less cost-effective than the 
regionalized payments.  
Uthes et al. (2010) also suggest that effectiveness and cost-effectiveness are sacrificed with the 
usual design of AES with homogeneous payments and with the additional goal of rural income 
creation. They propose that in line with Tinbergen (1952) the two goals should be targeted with 
two instruments and a way to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of an AES could be to 
distribute “a basic payment to all livestock-keeping farms for their contribution to the rural 
environment, and an additional top-up payment for environmental services to farms that 
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actually reduce livestock density and adjust grassland management.” To account for Rawlsian 
preferences and keep direct payments low they could be limited to a certain amount and scaled 
according to the size of the farm (smallest, small, medium, large) and in combination with an 
income parameter (such as income (e.g. gross operating surplus+personnel costs) per worker. 
This could possibly be an alternative to the proposed “reduction of payments as of €60,000 and 
compulsory capping for payments above €100,000 per farm” (where labour costs are taken fully 
into account) in the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) post 2020 (European Commision, 
2018). 
In our case study, homogeneous optimized payments are actually superior to regionally 
differentiated payments in region 2 – with the highest opportunity costs (i.e. “richest” region), 
where differentiated payments do not lead to more cost-effectiveness. There, as in region 1 (the 
“poorest” region), we have synergies between cost-effectiveness and equality, and equity 
resulting from homogeneous optimized payments. The more cost-effective regionalized 
payments lead to substantial redistribution effects and lower substantially the producer surplus 
for farmers in the “poorer” regions 1 and 3, but increase the producer surplus for farmers in the 
“richer” region 2.  This trade-off between maximizing public policies’ performance on a supra-
regional (national) level and the corresponding regional performance and distributive fairness 
is also identified in Mouysset (2014) and highlights the importance of analyzing public policy 
effects on different levels – state, federal state, and regional levels. 
Also important is a discussion on the socially desirable fairness principle in AES. Literature on 
PES offers more insights into this issue and suggests different fairness preferences of ecosystem 
service (ES) providers (e.g. farmers). Loft et al. (2017) find a preference for merit-system 
distribution, i.e. equity, among PES participants in Vietnam, whereas Gross-Camp et al. (2012) 
and Narloch et al. (2011) find preferences for an equal distribution in Rwanda and the Andes, 
respectively. In Markova-Nenova and Wätzold (2017) and Randrianarison and Waetzold 
(2017) potential ES buyers (donors) in Germany and in Madagascar show preferences for a 
maximin or equal distribution over an unknown distribution of PES in Madagascar. Based on a 
study on preferences for ethical milk attributes Markova-Nenova and Wätzold (2018) suggest 
that poor farmers’ support is important for milk buyers as taxpayers and potential ES buyers 
and support for all farmers is approved of only in one’s own region. A question arises how the 
fairness preferences would look like if ES buyers in AES had to choose between a less cost-
effective, but fairer homogeneous payments scheme and a more cost-effective, but less fair 
regionalized scheme. This could be a topic for future research. 
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Unfortunately, we have only mean income data available for the three economic regions in 
Saxony, which makes the analysis based on the maximin principle difficult. Much more detailed 
research results on distribution could be possible, if farm data in Germany were available 
openly as in Sweden (Nordin and Höjgård, 2018). This would in general facilitate research on 
agricultural topics. 
Another limitation of our analysis is the focus on three strictly defined social fairness principles 
relevant for the distribution of payments to farmers. We acknowledge that multiple dimensions 
of fairness exist, and pursuing different fairness objectives can lead to different results (Law et 
al., 2018). If we look at existence values (Schlosberg, 2009), or responsibility to future 
generations and to other species as environmental justice principles (Clayton, 2000) the fairness 
comparison will depend more strongly on the number of species conserved through an AES and 
the extent to which they are conserved.  
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Appendix A 
Tables: 
Table A. 1 Measures according to Directive “Agricultural environmental measures and 
forestation” (Directive AuW/2007), part A, section G ‚ “Extensive grassland use, nature 
conforming grassland management and conservation” (modified from Wätzold et al. 2016). 
Name of measure and main requirements 1 
 
Payment 
per ha  
in €1 
Size of 
area  
for this 
measure in 
2013 in ha2 
Overall 
expenses 
for this 
measure in 
2013 in €2 
G1a (extensive grassland management pasture)3 
use of pasture or of pasture with early mowing, minimum (maximum) stocking 
rate of 0.3 (1.4) grazing livestock unit per ha (GLU/ha), maximum input of 
liquid manure not to exceed 1.4 LU/ha per annum, N fertilizer restriction 
according to EC 834/2007 
108 23,734 2,563,272 
G1b (extensive grassland management meadow) 
extensive meadow, use of pasture allowed after 15 August (maximum stocking 
rate 1.4 GLU/ha), maximum input of liquid manure not to exceed 1.4 LU/ha 
per annum, N fertilizer restriction according to EC 834/2007 
108 6,265 676,620 
 
G2 (conservation-enhancing meadow use; no fertiliser before mowing, 15 
June) first mowing not allowed before 15 June (grazing only allowed after 1 
August), no application of N fertilizer before first mowing 
312 3,092 964,704 
G3a (conservation-enhancing meadow use; general ban on fertiliser, 15 June) 
first mowing not allowed before 15 June (grazing only allowed after 1 August), 
complete ban on application of N fertilizer  
373 11,417 4,258,541 
G3b (conservation-enhancing meadow use; general ban on fertiliser, 15 July) 
first mowing not allowed before 15 July (grazing only allowed after 1 
September), complete ban on application of N fertilizer 
394 3,105 1,223,370 
G5 (conservation-enhancing meadow use; ban on fertilizer, temporary halt of 
utilization)4 minimum two mowings per year, completion of first mowing not 
after 10 June, second mowing not before 15 September, complete ban on 
application of N fertilizer  
392 805 315,560 
G6 (conservation-enhancing grazing, late beginning) 
minimum period of grazing each year with minimum stocking rate 0.3 
GLU/ha, beginning of grazing not before 1 June, complete ban on application 
of N fertilizer 
190 4,701 893,190 
 
G9 (establishment of fallow land/strips on grassland) 
mowing and clearing of cut grass between 15 August and 15 November at least 
every two years, measure is only supported if (agriculturally used) grassland is 
adjacent, minimum size of 0.1 ha, maximum size of 2 ha, complete ban on 
application of N fertilizer 
536 368 197,248 
Note: Overall budget spent on the above measures: 11,092,505 € 
1 Information and data from Saxon State Ministry of the Environment and Agriculture (2015) 
2 Data from Saxon State Ministry of the Environment and Agriculture (2014b, p.50) 
3 Since this measure prescribes either pasture or pasture with mowing, in the simulation it is divided into two land 
use measures. 
4 Since this measure prescribes two flexible time limits in the simulation it is divided into two land use measures 
with different mowing times.  
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Table A. 2 Ecological effectiveness of the Saxon grassland AES – results of the simulation, the 
optimization and the regional optimization 
Species or  
Habitat types 
Simulation 
Ajeffin ha Statewide optimization Ajeffin ha 
Regional 
optimization 
Ajeffin ha 
Birds 
Black Grouse  12 139.77  13 847.09  18 208.59 
Corncrake  4 618.03  20 117.37  18 709.76 
Crested Lark   0.00   0.00   0.00 
Curlew  7 014.24  3 417.95  7 067.10 
Garganey   434.62   0.00   168.59 
Hoopoe   762.49   17.79  1 398.82 
Lapwing  11 618.22  20 401.44  23 449.90 
Meadow Pipit  46 921.47  51 412.36  64 607.56 
Partridge  16 715.04  24 138.54  28 057.03 
Redshank  11 378.51  18 698.35  21 545.56 
Skylark  8 615.30  16 816.79  19 395.99 
Snipe  3 031.74   596.37  2 201.72 
Whinchat  31 481.10  36 877.50  44 659.95 
Butterflies 
Amanda´s Blue   0.00   0.00   0.00 
Chestnut Heath   21.96   13.23   102.57 
Dingy Skipper   0.00   0.00   0.00 
Dusky Large Blue    0.00   25.39   7.04 
Five-spot Burnet   7.30   0.00   33.35 
Glanville Fritillary   0.00   0.00   0.00 
Large Wall Brown   0.00   0.00   0.00 
Marsh Fritillary   0.65   0.00   0.65 
Mazarine Blue   0.00   0.00   0.00 
Purple-edged Copper   2.36   0.00   88.71 
Scarce Large Blue   0.00   0.00   0.00 
Silver-spotted Skipper   0.00   0.00   0.00 
Small Blue   0.00   0.00   0.00 
Woodland Ringlet   13.31   0.00   88.06 
Habitat types 
Alluvial meadows   612.50   867.55   428.29 
Lowland hay meadows  1 840.14   822.41   0.00 
Molinia meadows   0.00   0.00   0.00 
Mountain hay meadows   836.35  3 157.33  3 362.31 
Nardus grassland   0.00   0.00   0.00 
Semi-natural dry grassland   0.00   0.00   0.00 
Wet meadows   515.63   218.75  1 759.38 
Total achieved effective area Atot
eff
 *  158 580.71  211 446.21  255 340.91 
% of all targeted species covered  62% 50% 62% 
Subtotal Abirds
eff
   154 730.52  206 341.55  249 470.56 
% of targeted species covered 92% 85% 92% 
SubtotalAbutterflies
eff
    45.58   38.62   320.37 
% of targeted species covered 36% 14% 43% 
Subtotal Ahabitats
eff
  3 804.61  5 066.04  5 549.98 
% of targeted species covered 57% 57% 43% 
Total participating area in ha 
 57 281.25  64 175.00  79 912.50 
Note: * equals the sum of column values 
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Table A. 3 Results from the simulation, the statewide optimization and the regional optimization of the Saxon AES (10, 7 and 10 measures resp.) 
Measure code*/ 
Measure ID 
Run Participating area per measure 
and region 
Total part. 
area per 
measure in ha 
Atot
eff
 per measure and region Atot
eff
 per 
measure 
Mean payment Pmean Mean producer surplus 
PSmean 
 region 1 region 2 region 3  region 1 region 2 region 3  region 1 region 2 region 3 region 1 region 2 region 3 
Mowing 23/6/01, LU 0/ 
96 
simul   812.50  1 043.75  1 225.00  3 081.25  3 832.16  5 168.89  7 275.90  16 276.96 312 312 312   250.04   250.07   256.97 
opti10 - -   437.50   437.50 - -  2 556.18  2 556.18 - - 535 - -   262.13 
regopti10 - -  3 556.25  3 556.25 - -  21 363.45  21 363.45 - - 304 - -   27.09 
Mowing 19/16/00, LU 2/ 
3410 
simul   293.75   12.50   75.00   381.25   883.66   39.17   245.91  1 168.74 392 392 392   192.76   192.76   192.76 
regopti10 -   293.75   237.50   531.25 -   892.23   778.91  1 671.15 - 631 372 -   275.99   59.02 
Mowing 21/14/00, LU 2/ 
3413 
simul   262.50   6.25   131.25   400.00  1 016.21   25.96   553.95  1 596.12 392 392 392   191.83   192.22   190.98 
opti10   818.75 -  3 793.75  4 612.50  3 308.47 -  15 196.11  18 504.59 631 - 631   321.71 -   338.26 
regopti10 -  -   687.50   687.50 - -  2 735.04  2 735.04 - - 351 - -   10.33 
Mowing 19/6/60, LU 2/ 
3439 
simul  2 031.25  2 993.75  1 231.25  6 256.25  2 682.17  4 136.33  1 637.61  8 456.10 108 108 108   51.19   51.63   51.40 
regopti10 - -   1 806.25  1 806.25 - -  2 379.58  2 379.58 - - 401 - -   40.47 
Mowing 23/6/60, LU 2/ 
3503 
simul -   6.25  11 193.75  11 200.00 -   30.11  51 977.79  52 007.90 - 373 373 -   299.59   302.63 
opti10 - -  4 281.25  4 281.25 - -  20 025.59  20 025.59 - - 374 - -   5.09 
regopti10 -   18.75  2 675.00  2 693.75 -   93.85  12 185.47  12 279.32 - 465 405 -   68.16   50.91 
Mowing 27/6/60, LU 2/ 
3550 
simul  2 118.75   31.25   931.25  3 081.25  13 475.48   186.24  6 058.41  19 720.13 394 394 394   290.53   285.76   288.56 
regopti10   756.25   506.25  2 406.25  3 668.75  5 071.95  3 175.68  17 426.56  25 674.19 432 747 449   39.66   315.98   74.04 
Rotational grazing 19/6/62, 
LU 101/ 
3610 
simul  1 900.00  2 093.75  3 500.00  7 493.75  2 779.26  2 844.47  4 656.19  10 279.92 108 108 108   38.67   45.03   37.95 
opti10  2 425.00  4 818.75  4 293.75  11 537.50  3 442.06  6 636.02  5 742.71  15 820.79 157 157 157   112.64   123.78   111.58 
regopti10  1 768.75  3 875.00  2 381.25  8 025.00  2 620.77  5 408.92  3 182.31  11 212.00 49 157 49   11.19   128.37   9.37 
Rotational grazing 21/6/62, 
LU 101/ 
3642 
simul   625.00  2 668.75  1 393.75  4 687.50  1 081.32  4 972.74  3 149.31  9 203.37 190 190 190   137.51   137.18   138.38 
opti10   193.75 -   1 081.25  1 275.00   390.88 -  2 850.97  3 241.85 163 - 163   127.28 -   129.91 
regopti10 -    943.75  7 768.75  8 712.50 -  1 707.77  20 332.10  22 039.87 - 163 52 -   105.21   7.81 
Mowing & pasture comb. 
19/6/62, LU 101/ 
3739 
simul  2 093.75  11 056.25  3 037.50  16 187.50  2 977.07  15 652.11  3 979.75  22 608.93 108 108 108   13.48   12.58   12.88 
opti10   925.00  1 800.00   468.75  3 193.75  1 353.82  2 419.56   617.54  4 390.92 236 236 236   164.97   164.97   164.97 
regopti10  2 381.25 -  11 556.25  13 937.50  3 362.63 -  15 456.42  18 819.05 89 - 94   13.86 -   8.22 
Mowing strips 19/6/6 1, LU 
2/ 
3922 
simul   362.50  3 893.75   256.25  4 512.50  1 253.58  15 048.51   960.45  17 262.53 79 79 79   113.93   120.34   112.84 
opti10  13 450.00  18 300.00  7 087.50  38 837.50  49 343.61  69 866.59  27 696.09  146 906.29 89 89 89   110.66   119.59   111.39 
regopti10  13 512.50  17 500.00  5 281.25  36 293.75  49 590.21  66 970.23  20 606.82  137 167.27 15 89 15   37.13   120.12   39.12 
Totals per region simul  10 500.00  23 806.25  22 975.00  57 281.25  29 980.91  48 104.52  80 495.28  158 580.71 200.42 122.06 266.78 119.87 62.93 194.46 
opti10  17 812.50  24 918.75  21 443.75  64 175.00  57 838.86  78 922.16  74 685.19  211 446.21 131.61 112.77 271.45 123.63 123.68 135.52 
regopti10  18 418.75  23 137.50  38 356.25  79 912.50  60 645.57  78 248.69  116 446.65  255 340.91 44.95 124.99 156.04 31.73 127.11 23.19 
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Table A. 3 continued 
Note: *The first number in the 
code is the quarter month (QM) 
of the first cut/beginning of 
grazing, the second (third) 
number indicates the interval 
between the first (second) cut 
and second (third) cut in QM. 
The forth number indicates that 
N-fertilizer is not allowed: 0 
(only after the first cut: 1), 
while LU indicates the 
maximum grazing livestock 
unit permitted. For example, 
“mowing 19/6/60 LU 2” means 
that the first cut is not allowed 
before the 19QM, a second cut 
is allowed six weeks later, a 
third cut or grazing is allowed 
six weeks after the second cut, 
and the use of N fertilizer is not 
allowed, the maximum grazing 
livestock units shall not exceed 
2 LU (corresponds to measure 
G1b in Table A. 1). 
 
Measure code*/ 
Measure ID 
Run Budget per measure and region Total budget 
per measure 
PS per measure and region Total PS 
per measure 
 region 1 region 2 region 3   region 1 region 2 region 3  
Mowing 23/6/01, LU 0/ 
96 
simul  253 500.00  325 650.00  382 200.00  961 350.00  203 159.59  261 015.21  314 791.32  778 966.11 
opti10   -   -  234 062.50  234 062.50 -   -  114 682.88  114 682.88 
regopti10   - - 1 081 100.00 1 081 100.00   - -  96 334.16  96 334.16 
Mowing 19/16/00, LU 2/ 
3410 
simul  115 150.00  4 900.00  29 400.00  149 450.00  56 621.78  2 409.44  14 456.63  73 487.84 
regopti10   -  185 356.25  88 350.00  273 706.25   0.00  81 073.24  14 016.86  95 090.10 
Mowing 21/14/00, LU 2/ 
3413 
simul  102 900.00  2 450.00  51 450.00  156 800.00  50 356.34  1 201.38  25 066.63  76 624.34 
opti10  516 631.25 - 2 393 856.25 2 910 487.50  263 403.29   - 1 283 280.09 1 546 683.38 
regopti10   -   -  241 312.50  241 312.50 -   -  7 104.18  7 104.18 
Mowing 19/6/60, LU 2/ 
3439 
simul  219 375.00  323 325.00  132 975.00  675 675.00  103 981.54  154 558.61  63 288.97  321 829.12 
regopti10 -   -  724 306.25  724 306.25   -   -  73 094.81  73 094.81 
Mowing 23/6/60, LU 2/ 
3503 
simul -  2 331.25 4 175 268.75 4 177 600.00   -  1 872.41 3 387 538.15 3 389 410.56 
opti10   -   - 1 601 187.50 1 601 187.50   -   -  21 803.01  21 803.01 
regopti10   -  8 718.75 1 083 375.00 1 092 093.75   -  1 278.01  136 186.94  137 464.95 
Mowing 27/6/60, LU 2/ 
3550 
simul  834 787.50  12 312.50  366 912.50 1 214 012.50  615 565.59  8 930.09  268 720.01  893 215.69 
regopti10  326 700.00  378 168.75 1 080 406.25 1 785 275.00  29 993.50  159 964.64  178 166.52  368 124.66 
Rotational grazing 19/6/62, 
LU 101/ 
3610 
simul  205 200.00  226 125.00  378 000.00  809 325.00  73 468.33  94 272.02  132 835.66  300 576.01 
opti10  380 725.00  756 543.75  674 118.75 1 811 387.50  273 153.36  596 477.44  479 108.94 1 348 739.74 
regopti10  86 668.75  608 375.00  116 681.25  811 725.00  19 785.74  497 452.70  22 318.38  539 556.82 
Rotational grazing 21/6/62, 
LU 101/ 
3642 
simul  118 750.00  507 062.50  264 812.50  890 625.00  85 946.69  366 101.92  192 868.73  644 917.34 
opti10  31 581.25   -  176 243.75  207 825.00  24 659.92   -  140 468.39  165 128.31 
regopti10   -  153 831.25  403 975.00  557 806.25   -  99 295.31  60 689.44  159 984.75 
Mowing & pasture comb. 
19/6/62, LU 101/ 
3739 
simul  226 125.00 1 194 075.00  328 050.00 1 748 250.00  28 220.72  139 086.42  39 127.08  206 434.22 
opti10  218 300.00  424 800.00  110 625.00  753 725.00  152 595.40  296 942.40  77 328.75  526 866.55 
regopti10  211 931.25   - 1 086 287.50 1 298 218.75  33 008.66   -  94 953.55  127 962.21 
Mowing strips 19/6/6 1, LU 
2/ 
3922 
simul  28 637.50  307 606.25  20 243.75  356 487.50  41 300.47  468 572.49  28 914.98  538 787.94 
opti10 1 197 050.00 1 628 700.00  630 787.50 3 456 537.50 1 488 418.39 2 188 422.57  789 474.17 4 466 315.14 
regopti10  202 687.50 1 557 500.00  79 218.75 1 839 406.25  501 682.38 2 102 037.99  206 589.18 2 810 309.55 
Totals per region simul 2 104 425.00 2 905 837.50 6 129 312.50 11 139 575.00 1 258 621.06 1 498 019.99 4 467 608.14 7 224 249.19 
opti10 2 344 287.50 2 810 043.75 5 820 881.25 10 975 212.50 2 202 230.36 3 081 842.42 2 906 146.22 8 190 219.00 
regopti10  827 987.50 2 891 950.00 5 985 012.50 9 704 950.00  584 470.26 2 941 101.89  889 454.03 4 415 026.19 
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Table A. 4 Comparison over Saxony and for each region of the cost-effectiveness measures (Efftype in Eq. 6) 
spatial level variable simul opti10 regopti10 
Saxony EffBirds 0.014 0.019 0.026 
region 1 EffBirds1 0.014 0.024 0.073 
region 2 EffBirds2 0.016 0.028 0.027 
region 3 EffBirds3 0.013 0.012 0.019 
Saxony EffButterflies 0.0000041 0.0000035 0.0000330 
region 1 EffButterflies1 0.0000003 0.0000000 0.0000008 
region 2 EffButterflies2 0.0000053 0.0000047 0.0000000 
region 3 EffButterflies3 0.0000048 0.0000044 0.0000534 
Saxony EffHabitats 0.00034 0.00046 0.00057 
region 1 EffHabitats1 0.00058 0.00055 0.00000 
region 2 EffHabitats2 0.00028 0.00000 0.00008 
region 3 EffHabitats3 0.00029 0.00065 0.00089 
Note: red indicates that optimizations are less cost-effective than the simulation;  
bold type indicates the most cost-effective scheme on each indicator in each region and  
bold green indicates the most cost-effective scheme on each indicator on federal state level for Saxony. 
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Figures: 
 
 
Figure A. 1 Regional comparison of the ecological effectiveness of the simulation (simul), the statewide optimization (opti10) and regional optimization (regopti10) 
for birds in region 1 (a), region 2 (b) and region 3 (c). The y-axis indicates the effective habitat area 
eff
jA  in ha achieved for each species. 
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opti10 2 677 6 457 0 8 0 0 5 797 13 696 7 116 5 366 4 950 0 10 476
regopti10 3 044 6 342 0 337 10 270 5 853 14 122 7 551 6 009 5 183 312 11 612
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Black
Grouse
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Lark
Curlew Garganey Hoopoe Lapwing
Meadow
Pipit
Partridge Redshank Skylark Snipe Whinchat
simul 2 288 2 396 0 343 11 4 2 905 18 909 4 253 2 189 1 638 228 12 109
opti10 4 590 8 374 0 0 0 0 7 505 19 618 9 088 7 778 6 079 0 15 877
regopti10 5 100 8 414 0 209 159 114 7 721 18 436 9 366 7 799 5 987 219 14 501
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Figure A. 3 (continued) 
Regional comparison of the ecological effectiveness of the simulation (simul), the statewide optimization (opti10) and regional optimization (regopti10) for birds 
in region 3 (c). The y-axis indicates the effective habitat area 
eff
jA  in ha achieved for each species
Black
Grouse
Corncrake
Crested
Lark
Curlew Garganey Hoopoe Lapwing
Meadow
Pipit
Partridge Redshank Skylark Snipe Whinchat
simul 7 801 660 0 5 638 170 178 6 957 19 740 9 263 7 266 5 547 2 027 13 455
opti10 6 580 5 286 0 3 410 0 18 7 100 18 098 7 934 5 554 5 788 596 10 525
regopti10 10 065 3 954 0 6 520 0 1 015 9 876 32 050 11 140 7 738 8 225 1 671 18 547
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Amanda´s
Blue
Chestnut
Heath
Dingy
Skipper
Dusky
Large Blue
Five-spot
Burnet
Glanville
Fritillary
Large Wall
Brown
Marsh
Fritillary
Mazarine
Blue
Purple-
edged
Copper
Scarce
Large Blue
Silver-
spotted
Skipper
Small Blue
Woodland
Ringlet
simul 0 6,69 0 0 7,30 0 0 0 0 2,36 0 0 0 13,31
opti10 0 0 0 25,39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
regopti10 0 102,57 0 7,04 33,35 0 0 0 0 88,71 0 0 0 88,06
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region 1   
simul 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.65 0 0 0 0 0 0 
opti10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
regopti10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.65 0 0 0 0 0 0 
region 2  
simul 0 15.27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
opti10 0 13.23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
regopti10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Figure A. 2 Regional comparison of the ecological effectiveness of the simulation (simul), the statewide optimization (opti10) and regional optimization 
(regopti10) for butterflies in region 1, 2 and 3. The y-axis indicates the effective habitat area 
eff
jA  in ha achieved for each species.
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Alluvial
meadows
Lowland hay
meadows
Molinia
meadows
Mountain
hay
meadows
Nardus
grassland
Semi-natural
dry grassland
Wet
meadows
simul 179 247 0 825 0 0 513
opti10 206 188 0 3 157 0 0 219
regopti10 206 0 0 3 362 0 0 1 759
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region 1  
simul 422 803 0 0 0 0 0 
opti10 662 635 0 0 0 0 0 
regopti10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
region 2  
simul 12 791 0 11 0 0 3 
opti10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
regopti10 223 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Figure A. 3 Regional comparison of the ecological effectiveness of the simulation (simul), the 
statewide optimization (opti10) and regional optimization (regopti10) for habitat types in region 
1, 2 and 3. The y-axis indicates the effective habitat area 
eff
jA in ha achieved for each species. 
Appendix B 
For our analysis we consider farms with a relatively high percentage of grassland area which 
are likely to participate in a grassland AES (e.g. cattle and dairy farms). In Saxony these are the 
following types of farms with a relatively high percentage of grassland area which are likely to 
participate in a grassland AES according to TF8 grouping of the FADN (Farm Accountancy 
Data Network) with the respective EU-code (European Commission, 2019): 
- 450. Specialist dairying 
- 460. Specialist cattle - rearing and fattening 
- 470. Cattle - dairying, rearing and fattening combined 
- 482. Sheep and cattle combined 
- 483. Specialist goats 
- 484. Various grazing livestock 
- 731. Mixed livestock, mainly dairying 
- 831. Field crops combined with dairying 
- 832. Dairying combined with field crops 
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